Bare Nouns in Japanese and Korean

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1. Introduction

Consider the subjects of the following Japanese and Korean sentences.[1]

(1) a. Subete-no-burudoggu-ga hoeta.
all-GEN-bulldog-NOM barked
'All bulldogs barked.'

b. Motun-pwultok-i cicessta
all-bulldog-NOM barked
'All bulldogs barked.'

(2) a. Sono-burudoggu-ga hoeta.
that-bulldog-NOM barked
'That bulldog barked.'

b. Ku-pwultok-i cicessta.
that-bulldog-NOM barked
'That bulldog barked.'

(3) a. Taro-no-burudoggu-ga hoeta.
Taro-GEN-bulldog-NOM barked
'Taro's bulldog barked.'

b. Chelswu-uy-pwultok-i cicessta.
Chelswu-GEN-bulldog-NOM barked
'Chelswu's bulldog barked.'

(4) a. Burudoggu-ga hoeta.
bulldog-NOM barked
'A bulldog barked.'
b. Pwultok-i cicessta.
bulldog-NOM barked
'A bulldog barked.'

In (1-3) the common nouns *burudoggu/pultok* are modified by some determiner. For instance, *subete/motun* 'all' in (1) are quantifiers. Given this, it would be plausible to analyze *subete-no-burudoggu/motun-pwultok* 'all bulldogs' in (1) as in (5), where the common nouns *burudogg/pwultok* are NPs and the quantifiers take them, projecting DPs.

(5) a. [$_{DP}$ subete-no [$_{NP}$ burudoggu]]
b. [$_{DP}$ motun [$_{NP}$ pwultok]]

Similarly, given that *sono/ku* 'that' in (2) and *Taro/Chelswu* in (3) are demonstratives and possessives, respectively, it would be plausible to think that the common nouns *burudoggu/pwultok* are NPs, and that the demonstratives and the possessives take them, projecting DPs. As for the subjects of the sentences in (1-3), therefore, we can safely say that they are DPs.

But how about the subjects of the sentences in (4)? We saw that the common nouns *burudoggu/pwultok* 'bulldog' are NPs in (1-3). The common nouns are left bare in (4). One might conclude from these facts that the subjects of the sentences in (4) are NPs. However, this line of argument is at odds with the standard view on what can serve as an argument in sentences. According to introductory textbooks and references, common nouns are (Ns and project to) NPs and ignoring intensions, denote sets of entities (of type <e,t>). Determiners take them, projecting to DPs, which denote generalized quantifiers (of type <<e,t>,t>). NPs are predicative and thus they cannot serve as arguments until

determiners take them. DPs are argumental and they can serve as arguments in sentences.[2]

From this point of view, bare nouns in Japanese and Korean are worth looking into. The aim of this paper is to examine bare nouns in Japanese and Korean with reference to bare plurals in English, which can also serve as arguments without being modified by a determiner.

2. Bare Nouns as Proper Names of Kinds

Some additional examples of bare nouns in Japanese and Korean are the following. In each pair of the examples the bare nouns *burudoggu/pwultok* 'bulldog' serve as the subjects.

(6) a. Burudoggu-ga hoeta. (=(4a))
bulldog-NOM barked
'A bulldog barked.'

b. Pwultok-i cicessta. (=(4b))
bulldog-NOM barked
'A bulldog barked.'

(7) a. Burudoggu-wa zunguri-siteiru.
bulldog-TOP stout
'Bulldogs are stout.'

b. Pwultok-un ttangttalmak-hata.
bulldog-TOP stout
'Bulldogs are stout.'

(8) a. Burudoggu-wa igirisu-de tukuridasareta.
bulldog-TOP England-in was created
'Bulldogs were created in England.'

b. Pwultok-un yengkuk-eyse mantulecyssta.
bulldog-TOP England-in was created
'Bulldogs were created in England.'

If we stick to the view that arguments are DPs, the bare nouns have to be DPs. But how can they be DPs? One way out is to analyze them as in (9), where *burudoggu/pwultok* 'bulldog' are NPs, and some phonetically null determiner takes them, projecting DPs.

(9) a. $[_{DP}\ \Phi\ [_{NP}$ burudoggu]]
b. $[_{DP}\ \Phi\ [_{NP}$ pwultok]]

At first sight this analysis seems to be attractive because introducing the null determiner allows us to treat the subjects of the sentences in (6-8) on par with the subjects of the sentences in (1-3) above; that is, both in (6-8) and in (1-3) some determiner takes an NP, projecting a DP.

However, what is the nature of this hypothetical determiner? The sentences in (6) mean that there is a bulldog which barked. Here the bare nouns seem to be interpreted existentially. Then the null determiner should be a kind of existential quantifier. On the other hand, the sentences in (7) mean that bulldogs are generally stout. This time, the bare nouns seem to be interpreted generically. Then the null determiner should be a kind of universal quantifier. This situation forces us to postulate two different determiners for (6) and (7). One might say that we could postulate as many determiners as we need. In (8), however, it is not even clear what kind of determiner we should postulate. In (8) the bare nouns do not seem to be interpreted existentially or generically. The sentences in (8) are not saying that there is a bulldog which was created in England or that all bulldogs were created in England.

But how are the bare nouns interpreted in (8) then? In order to answer this question, I introduce Carlson's (1977) theory of bare plurals in English. He argues that there is evidence in plenty to suggest that bare plurals refer to kinds of things. For example, he

observes that bare plurals can be replaced with an expression which is apparently kind-oriented without changing the conveyed meaning.

(10) a. Pandas are on the verge of extinction.

b. This kind of animal is on the verge of extinction.

(10a) is different from (10b) in that the bare plural *pandas* is replaced with the expression *this kind of animal*, which is apparently kind-oriented, but (10a) can mean the same as (10b) if the context of situation is appropriate. This fact suggests that the bare plural *pandas* is kind-oriented, too.

Interestingly, this is true for bare nouns in Japanese and Korean, too. Let us return to (8) and replace the bare nouns *burudoggu/pultok* 'bulldog' with the expressions *sono-syurui-no-inu/ku-conglyu-ui-kay* 'that kind of dog'.[3]

(11) a. Sono-syurui-no-inu-wa igirisu-de tukuridasareta.
that-kind-GEN-dog-TOP England-in was created
'That kind of dog was created in England.'

b. Ku-conglyu-uy-kay-nun yengkuk-eyse mantulecyssta.
that-kind-GEN-dog-TOP England-in was created
'That kind of dog was created in England.'

The sentences in (11) can impart the same message as the corresponding sentences in (8) if the context is appropriate. Suppose bulldogs are the topic of conversation when the sentences in (11) are uttered. In this context the sentences in (11) can mean that bulldogs were created in England like the sentences in (8) do. The key fact here is that the expressions *sono-syurui-no-inu/ku-conglyu-uy-kay* in (11) are kind-oriented as is obvious from the use of the words *syurui/conglyu* 'kind'. Given that the sentences in (8) and the sentences in (11) can be interpreted alike, we might consider the bare nouns *burudoggu/pwultok* in (8) as kind-oriented, too. The difference between the bare nouns

burudoggu/pultok in (8) and the expressions *sono-syurui-no-inu/ku-conglyu-uy-kay* in (11) is only that the former always refer to the kind bulldog whereas the latter refer to different kinds of dog depending on the context, i.e., what is the topic of conversation. Being able to refer to something directly is typical of proper names. Therefore, let us consider the bare nouns *burudoggu/pwultok* as the proper names of the kind bulldog in (8).

In treating bare nouns as proper names, an analogy to a more uncontroversial proper name like *Louis* might be helpful.

(12) a. Louis-wa zunguri-siteiru.
Louis-TOP stout
'Louis is stout.'
b. Louis-nun ttangttalmak-hata.
Louis-TOP stout
'Louis is stout.'

Semantically, proper names refer to entities (of type <e>). For example, *Louis* in (12) refers to a certain object, namely, a bulldog named Louis. Proper names are argumental as well as generalized quantifiers are. Therefore, *Louis* itself is ready to serve as the subject, and it does not have to be taken by a determiner. On the other hand, the bare nouns *burudoggu/pwultok* 'bulldog' in (4-8) refer to a certain kind of dog, namely bulldog. We can now explain how they can serve as the subjects in (4-8); being proper names, they are themselves argumental.

It might be plausible to say that the bare nouns *burudoggu/pwultok* 'bulldog' refer to the kind bulldog in (8). After all, the sentences in (8) amount to saying that bulldogs are an artificial kind. But how about the sentences in (6) and (7), which are repeated here as (13) and (14), respectively? It seems to be less plausible to say that the bare nouns refer to the kind bulldog in (13). Remember that the sentences in (13) are interpreted as meaning that there is a bulldog which barked.

(13) a. Burudoggu-ga hoeta.
bulldog-NOM barked
'A bulldog barked.'
b. Pwultok-i cicessta.
bulldog-NOM barked
'A bulldog barked.'

(14) a. Burudoggu-wa zunguri-siteiru.
bulldog-TOP stout
'Bulldogs are stout.'
b. Pwultok-un ttangttalmak-hata.
bulldog-TOP stout
'Bulldogs are stout.'

However, the bare nouns *burudoggu/pwultok* can be replaced with the expressions *sono-syurui-no-inu/ku-conglyu-uy-kay* 'that kind of dog' without changing the conveyed meaning in (13) and (14) too.

(15) a. Sono-syurui-no-inu-ga hoeta.
that-kind-GEN-dog-NOM barked
'That kind of dog barked.'
b. Ku-conglyu-uy-kay-ka cicessta.
that-kind-GEN-dog-NOM barked
'That kind of dog barked.'

(16) a. Sono-syurui-no-inu-wa zunguri-siteiru.
That-kind-GEN-dog-TOP stout
'That kind of dog is stout.'
b. Ku-conglyu-ui-kay-nun ttangttalmak-hata.
That-kind-GEN-dog-TOP stout
'That kind of dog is stout.'

If the context is appropriate, the sentences in (15) and (16) can impart the same message as the corresponding sentences in (13) and (14) do; like the sentences in (13), the sentences in (15) can mean that there is a bulldog which barked, and like the sentences in (14), the sentences in (16) can mean that bulldogs are generally stout. As noted above, the expressions *sono-syurui-no-inu/ku-conglyu-uy-kay* are apparently kind-oriented. Since the sentences in (13) and (14) and the corresponding sentences in (15) and (16) can be interpreted alike, we might consider the bare nouns *burudoggu/pwultok* as kind-oriented in (13) and (14) too.

The above discussion undermines the analysis given in (5). As we have seen, the sentences in (13-14) and the corresponding sentences in (15-16) can be interpreted alike. Then we expect them to have the same syntactic structure in the relevant respects. But note that the expressions *sono-syurui-no-inu/ku-conglyu-uy-kay* 'that kind of dog' are analyzed as in (17).

(17) a. [$_{DP}$ sono-syurui-no [$_{NP}$ inu]]

b. [$_{DP}$ ku-conglyu-uy [$_{NP}$ kay]]

In (17) *sono-syurui/ku-conglyu-uy-kay* 'that kind' serve as the (complex) determiners. With these determiners, there is no room left for a null quantifier. However, the sentences in (15) can still be interpreted existentially as well as the sentences in (13). Given this, postulating a null determiner to bring about an existential interpretation only for the bare nouns *burudoggu/pwultok* 'bulldog' in (13) would fail to capture the interpretational parallelism of the sentences in (15) with the sentences in (13). Similarly, postulating a null determiner to bring about a generic interpretation only for the bare nouns in (14) would fail to capture the interpretational parallelism of the sentences in (16) with the sentences in (14).

Given that bare nouns are proper names, how is it that sentences where bare nouns appear can be interpreted existentially or generically? We address this in the next section.

3. Carlson's Ontology

We have appealed intuitively to such notions as kinds and objects. But they cannot be handled adequately within an ordinary ontology. In order to accommodate them, we need a richer set of sorts of entities. Carlson (1977) develops such an ontology.

According to Carlson, the domain of entities is not homogeneous. He proposes to recognize three sorts in the domain of entities: kinds, objects, and stages. Objects and kinds are more or less things and kinds of things, respectively. Stages are time-space slices of objects and kinds. Objects and kinds jointly form the type of individuals. Individuals can have names. For example, some object may be named *John*. Similarly, some kind may be named *ailuropoda melanoleuca*. For the latter, we instead use the bare plural *pandas* in daily English. As opposed to individuals, stages are not named. Kinds can be realized by objects and stages, and objects can be realized by stages.

Predicates are also classified in sortal terms. For example, predicates like (*igirisu-de*) *tukuridasareta/*(*yengkuk-eyse*) *mantulecyssta* 'was created (in England)' apply to kinds. Since the bare nouns *burudoggu/pwultok* 'bulldog' are kind-referring expressions, these predicates can simply take them. Therefore, the sentences in (5), which are repeated in (18), translate into (19).

(18) a. Burudoggu-wa igirisu-de tukuridasareta.
bulldog-TOP England-in was created
'Bulldogs were created in England.'

b. Pwultok-un yengkuk-eyse mantulecyssta.
bulldog-TOP England-in was created
'Bulldogs were created in England.'

(19) was-created-in-England(bulldog)

On the other hand, predicates like *zunguri-siteiru/ttangttalmak-hata* 'stout' basically apply to objects. These predicates can take the proper name *Luis* since it is an object-referring expression. Therefore, the sentences in (12), which are repeated in (20), translate into (21).

(20) a. Louis-wa zunguri-siteiru.
Louis-TOP stout
'Louis is stout.'
b. Louis-nun ttangttalmak-hata.
Louis-TOP stout
'Louis is stout.'

(21) stout(Louis)

Now return to the examples in (7), which are repeated in (22).

(22) a. Burudoggu-wa zunguri-siteiru.
bulldog-TOP stout
'Bulldogs are stout.'
b. Pwultok-un ttangttalmak-hata.
bulldog-TOP stout
'Bulldogs are stout.'

Zunguri-siteiru/ttangttalmak-hata are object-level predicates, but the bare nouns *burudoggu/pwultok* 'bulldog' are kind-referring expressions. This mismatch has to be somehow resolved. Note that in (22) the predicates ascribe a general property to the kind bulldog. In order to raise the level of the predicates in such cases, Carlson introduces the operator G, which maps predicates of a lower level onto those of a higher level. Thanks to this operator, the predicates *zunguri-siteiru/ttangttalmak-hata* can take kind-referring expressions, and the sentences in (22) translate into (23), which says that bulldogs have the general property of being stout.

(23) G(stout)(bulldog)

In (6), which is repeated here as (24), another kind of sort mismatch arises.

(24) a. Burudoggu-ga hoeta.
bulldog-NOM barked
'A bulldog barked.'
b. Pwultok-i cicessta.
bulldog-NOM barked
'A bulldog barked.'

Predicates like *hoeta/cicessta* 'barked' basically apply to stages. As opposed to what they want, however, the bare nouns *burudoggu/pwultok* 'bulldog' are kind-referring expressions. Note that the sentences in (24) are interpreted as asserting the existence of a realization of the kind bulldog. This means that this sort mismatch should be fixed by introducing an existential quantification over realizations of the kind. Given this, adopting Carlson's relation R, which holds between realizations and their associated individuals, e.g., R(x, bulldog) means that x realizes the kind bulldog, we can represent the interpretation of the sentences in (24) as (25), where x is a variable over stages.[4] Remember that kinds can be realized by stages. Therefore, (25) says that there is a stage of the kind bulldog which barked.

(25) $\exists x^{s}[R(x, \text{bulldog}) \wedge \text{barked}(x)]$

4. Further Evidence

Besides the fact that bare plurals in English can be replaced with an expression which apparently refers to a kind, Krifka et al. (1995) give some evidence for the plausibility of the claim that bare plurals refer to kinds. In this section I will show that what they say about bare plurals in English apply to bare nouns in Japanese and Korean, too.

In English an anaphoric relation can hold between a bare plural and a proform like *they* even if they seem to be interpreted differently. Observe the sentences in (26).

(26) a. May hates raccoons because they stole her sweet corn.

b. Raccoons stole May's sweet corn, so she now hates them with a passion.

(Carlson (1977: 25))

In (26a) the matrix clause is interpreted generically whereas the subordinate clause is interpreted existentially. In (26b), on the other hand, the first sentence is interpreted existentially whereas the second sentence is interpreted generically. Despite this fact, the pronoun *they* (*them*) is felicitous in these examples. In Japanese and Korean too, an anaphoric relation can hold between a bare noun and a proform like *sore/kukes* 'it'.[5] In (27) the first sentences are interpreted existentially whereas the second sentences are interpreted generically, and in (28) vice versa. Despite this, the pronouns *sore/kukes* are felicitous in these examples.

(27) a. Taro-wa ringo-o tabeta. Kare-wa sore-ga sukida.
Taro-Top apple-ACC ate he-TOP it-NOM like
'Taro ate an apple. He likes them.'

b. Chelswu-nun sakwa-lul mekessta. Ku-nun kukes-i cohta.
Chelswu-TOP apple-ACC ate he-TOP it-NOM like
'Chelswu ate an apple. He likes them.'

(28) a. Taro-wa ringo-ga sukida. Dakara kare-wa sore-o tabeta.
Taro-TOP apple-NOM like so he-TOP it-ACC ate
'Taro likes apples. So he ate one.'

b. Chelswu-nun sakwa-ka cohta.
Chelswu-TOP apple-NOM like
Kulayse ku-nun kukes-ul mekessta.
So he-TOP it-ACC ate
'Chelswu likes apples. So he ate one.'

This behavior of the pronouns is unexpected if bare plurals/bare nouns are ambiguous

between an existential and a generic interpretation, but not if bare plurals/bare nouns are proper names of kinds. Intuitively, pronouns refer to the same things as their antecedents. This is indeed possible with the pronouns in the above sentences if the bare plural raccoon and the bare nouns *ringo/sakwa* 'apple' are proper names. Being a proper name, *raccoons* refers to the kind raccoon. Then, if *they* (*them*) refers to the kind raccoon too, it should be felicitous. Being bare nouns, *ringo/sakwa* refer to the kind apple. Then, if the pronouns *sore/kukes* 'it' refer to the kind apple too, they should be felicitous.

Bare plurals in English can be shared by an existential and a generic sentence. In (29) the matrix clause is interpreted generically while the relative clause is interpreted existentially. But they can share the bare plural *dolphins*.

(29) Dolphins, which you saw in the aquarium, are mammals.

Bare nouns in Japanese and Korean can also be shared by an existential and a generic sentence. In (30) the matrix clauses are interpreted existentially while the relative clauses are interpreted generically, but they can share the bare nouns *ringo/sakwa* 'apple'.

(30) a. Jiro-wa [$_{Obj}$ [$_{RelCl}$ Taro-ga sukina] ringo-o] katta.
Jiro-TOP Taro-NOM like apple-ACC bought
'Jiro bought apples, which Taro likes.'

b. Yengswu-nun [$_{Obj}$ [$_{RelCl}$ Chelswu-ka cohahanun] sakwa-lul] sassta.
Yengswu-TOP Chelswu-NOM like apple-ACC bought
'Yengswu bought apples, which Chelswu likes.'

The acceptability of these examples is mysterious under the view that bare plurals/bare nouns in themselves obtain an existential or a generic interpretation. If bare plurals/bare nouns obtain an existential interpretation, how can a generic sentence take them? On the other hand, if bare plurals/bare nouns obtain a generic interpretation, how can an existential sentence take them? But the view that bare plurals/bare nouns are proper

names of kinds does not suffer from this problem. Under this view the bare plural *dolphins* plays the same role, i.e., refers to the kind dolphin, both in the matrix clause and in the relative clause. Therefore, there is nothing wrong with the matrix clause and the relative clause sharing the bare plural. Similarly, the bare nouns *ringo/sakwa* 'apple' refer to the kind apple both in the matrix clauses and the relative clauses, and therefore, there is nothing wrong with these clauses sharing the bare nouns.

English sentences are not always ambiguous between an existential and a generic reading. For example, (31a) is interpreted existentially while (31b) is interpreted generically.

(31) a. Cats are meowing.
b. Cats are selfish.

Japanese and Korean sentences are not always ambiguous either.[6] Take as examples (6) and (7), which are repeated here as (32) and (33), respectively. As discussed above, the sentences in (32) are interpreted existentially, and the sentences in (33) generically.

(32) a. Burudoggu-ga hoeta.
bulldog-NOM barked
'A bulldog barked.'
b. Pwultok-i cicessta.
bulldog-NOM barked
'A bulldog barked.'

(33) a. Burudoggu-wa zunguri-siteiru.
bulldog-TOP stout
'Bulldogs are stout.'
b. Pwultok-un ttangttalmak-hata.
bulldog-TOP stout
'Bulldogs are stout.'

These sentences have the same bare plural/bare nouns as the subjects, but they are different with respect to the predicates. Since the only apparent difference is with respect to the predicates, they are the most promising candidate for the factor on which the interpretation hinges. This is more consistent with the view that the role played by bare plurals/bare nouns is constant than with the view that they are in themselves ambiguous between an existential and a generic reading.

When scope sensitive elements interact, ambiguities arise. In the *a*-examples of (34-36) nouns modified by an indefinite article, which can be considered as existentially quantified expressions, interact with a universally quantified expression, an intensional predicate, and a negation, respectively, hence the ambiguity.

(34) a. Everyone read a book on giraffes. (Carlson (1977: 11))
b. Everyone read books on giraffes. (Carlson (1977: 12))
(35) a. Max is looking for a book on Danish cooking. (Carlson (1977: 9))
b. Max is looking for books on Danish cooking. (Carlson (1977: 9))
(36) a. John didn't see a spot on the floor. (Carlson (1977: 11))
b. John didn't see spots on the floor. (Carlson (1977: 11))

If the corresponding bare plurals are existentially quantified expressions, the *b*-examples should be ambiguous too. However, this expectation is not borne out. The *b*-examples only allow a reading where the bare plurals take narrow scope. Hasegawa (1993) points out the strong tendency of bare nouns in Japanese to take narrow scope. The same seems to be true of bare nouns in Korean too. Consider the following sentences.

(37) a. Futari-no-gakusei-o dono-kyoozyu-mo sikatta
2CL-GEN-student-ACC every professor scolded
'Every professor scolded two students.'

b. Twu-myeng-uy-haksayng-ul enu-kyoswu-to namwulassta
2-CL-GEN-student-ACC every professor scolded
'Every professor scolded two students.'

(38) a. Gakusei-o dono-kyoozyu-mo sikatta.
student-ACC every professor scolded
'Every professor scolded a student.'

b. Haksayng-ul enu-kyoswu-to namwulassta.
student-ACC every professor scolded
'Every professor scolded a student.'

The sentences in (38) are different from those in (37) in that the expressions which are more uncontroversially analyzed as existentially quantified are replaced with bare nouns. In (37) the universally quantified expressions interact scopally with *futari-no-gakusei/twu-myeng-uy-haksayng* 'two students', which are uncontroversially analyzed as being quantified, and hence the ambiguity. If the corresponding bare nouns are quantified expressions, the sentences in (38) should be ambiguous, too, but this prediction is not borne out. How bare plurals/bare nouns exhibit the scope possibilities that they do calls for explanation. When a stage-level predicate takes a bare plural/bare noun, which we assume to refer to a kind, an existential quantifier over stages of the kind has to be introduced. Carlson argues that stage-level predicates have existential quantifiers over stages in their lexical semantics. These existential quantifiers, being internal to the lexical semantics of stage-level predicates, cannot take scope over other scope sensitive elements which are introduced at syntax.

5. Conclusion

In this paper I have argued that semantically, bare nouns in Japanese and Korean refer to kinds in the same way as bare plurals in English. This is consistent with Chierchia's (1998) claim that nouns in classifier languages are referring expressions, of type <e>. But how about their syntax? More specifically, what is their syntactic

category? If Chierchia (1998) is right in saying that NPs can be argumental as well as DPs depending on the language, we can regard bare nouns as NPs. On the other hand, if we assume that arguments are DPs, bare nouns should be DPs. For them to project to DPs, one might postulate a null determiner to take them (Contreras (1986)) or assume that they raise from N to D (Longobardi (1994)). I leave these important issues for future research.

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Notes

1. Common nouns in Japanese and Korean are neutral with respect to number and with respect to (in)definiteness. Thus *burudoggu/pultok* are compatible with the English translations a bulldog/bulldogs and the bulldog/the bulldogs. In this paper, however, I will limit the discussion to bare nouns which are interpreted as indefinite.
2. For a discussion of argumenthood, see, for example, Stowell (1991).
3. The further study of the expression *kind* and its Japanese and Korean counterparts *syurui/conglyu* is beyond the scope of this paper. For a discussion of the expression *kind*, see Carlson (1977).
4. I will use sorted variables for the sake of clarity.
5. Although I give *it* as the word-to-word translation of *sore/kukes*, *sore/kukes* are different from *it* in an important respect. Unlike *it*, *sore/kukes* can readily refer back to kind-referring expressions as in (27). In this respect, they are more like *one* or *they*.
6. For Japanese, see Kuno (1973).

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